The Dominion Party stood for UDI and apartheid and saw UFP’s policy
of ‘Partnership’ and the limited political concessions to Africans as a
threat to the European’s future in the Federation. Hence, at the 1962
elections, the white electorate voted for the more ruthless and reactionary
Rhodesian Front Party. The Africans boycotted the elections on the
ground that their political representation was totally inadequate. The
Rhodesian Front regime immediately embarked on measures against
African nationalists aimed at oppressing and dividing them, and in this
way, they were assisted by a serious split in ZAPU which occurred in
July, 1968.
The People’s Caretaker Council (PCC) and the Birth of the Zimba-
bwe African National Union (ZANU)
54. Following the banning of ZAPU, the People’s Caretaker Council
(PCC) was formed in Southern Bhodesia under the leadership of Joshua
Nkomo. The Party, however, continued to use the name of ZAPU outside
Southern Rhodesia. Just at this point, part of the leadership of former
ZAPU rallied round the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole in opposition to Joshua
Nkomo. The division became very serious, and all attempts at reconsi-
liation failed to bring the two factions together. Consequently, the hitherto
united mass nationalist movement of Zimbabwe lost its cohesive strength
and degenerated into warring factions.
55. The split led to the formation of another political party, the
Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) in July, 1963, under the
leadership of the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole. ZANU membership was
predominantly composed of Shona ethnic groups. New problems soon
arose which considerably weakened the nationalist struggle against the
settlers, who, since December, 1962, had come under the leadership of
the Rhodesian Front. The period of the split was characterised by a bitter
struggle for supremacy between the two rival nationalist movements,
resulting in carnage and wanton destruction of property. The racist
regime of Southern Rhodesia took advantage of this situation and banned
both the PCO and ZANU in 1964, and detained the leaders and militants
of both Parties.
Chitepo and ZANU External Wing
56. When ZANU was banned in Southern Rhodesia and could only
openly operate as an organisation outside Southern Rhodesia, Chitepo
became its central figure. At that time, the Party’s temporary Head-
quarters was located in Dar-es-Salaam. Chitepo first came in the limelight
in 1963 when he was elected National Chairman of the newly formed
ZANU while still in the service of the Tanganyika Government as Director
of Public Prosecutions. In order to strengthen Chitepo’s position and to
give force and authority to his leadership, the Central Committee (which
still existed in Southern Rhodesia) gave special mandate to

direct the affairs of the Party. Thus, Chitepo assumed leadership of the
External Wing of the Party. His engagement with the Tanganyika
Government, however, left him very little time and scope for the pressing
demands of the Party in its expanding activities. Therefore, in January,
1966, he relinquished his post with the Tanganyika Government and
became fully occupied with the Party and its liberation struggle.
57. From then on, Chitepo embodied the life and spirit of ZANU,
energising its purpose to the one supreme end of freeing Southern Rhodesia
from white rule. Around him revolved the machinery of the Party, whose
policy and day-to-day affairs he directed and administered. Chitepo’s
position in the Party was unchallengeable and permanent and his figure
was unique. Such was the force of character and personality of the man
that his leadership was acknowledged and unquestioned. At this time, an
executive body was formed and named the ‘Revolutionary Council’, to
control the machinery of the Party. Membership of the Revolutionary
Council was by appointment, with Chitepo as a Permanent Head.
58. Onthe other hand, members of the PCC outside Southern Rhodesia
also re-organised themselves and continued to prosecute the struggle for
the liberation of Zimbabwe separately and independently.
The Quest for Unity
59. As a result of the successful struggle waged by the people of
Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the Central African Federation was
dissolved in 1963. In 1964, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland got their
Independence from British rule and those countries became Zambia and
Malawi, respectively. However, owing to settler intransigence there were
no visible changes on the political scene in Southern Rhodesia in line
with the developments in both Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. And
to make it worse, the Rhodesian Front regime of Ian Smith declared UDI.
60. This defiant act on the part of white settlers sent shock waves into
the very foundations of nationalist organisations throughout Zimbabwe.
The inevitability of armed struggle was then being seriously considered
by the nationalists as the only effective remedy. Consequently, ZANU
and ZAPU External Wings embarked on an intensive training programme
of their youths and militants for guerrilla warfare in Zimbabwe. In
keeping with their avowed objective, the Zimbabwe liberation move-
ments launched the armed struggle. ZANU launched its armed struggle
in April, 1966, the year it transferred its Headquarters to Lusaka,
Zambia.
61. Meanwhile, the quest for unity between the two nationalist
organisations, ZAPU and ZANU, was still going on, but was far from
materialising. To make matters worse, some disaffected members from
both ZANU and ZAPU broke away at this time from their respective
Parties and came together to form a new political Party called the Front
8

for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI). With the confusion created
by the formation of FROLIZI, the issue of unity among the nationalist
movements in Zimbabwe became even more imperative.
The African National Council (ANC) and the Lusaka Unity Accord
62. The African National Council (ANC) was born in 1971 out of an
attempt to test African opinion about the basis of independence for
Southern Rhodesia. Initially, the ANC did not hold itself out as a political
Party, this being prohibited by the Rhodesian regime. But it succeeded
in mustering and welding the masses together and made it possible for the
Africans to unequivocally refuse to accept the 1971 Anglo-Rhodesian
Agreement. The ANC became an organisation to mobilise the people of
Zimbabwe and revived in them a spirit of renewed political aspiration.
This was a dismaying prospect to the white population generally and to
the illegal Rhodesian regime in particular. From this point the ANC
became in effect a political party within Zimbabwe.
63. Since all efforts by the OAU to unite the nationalist Parties in
Zimbabwe had failed, the only hope of achieving this objective now seemed
to lie in Joshua Nkomo of ZAPU and the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole of
ZANU, who were still in prison in Southern Rhodesia. There had been
several OAU resolutions calling for the release of these leaders. Following
the defeat of the Portuguese in Mozambique and the intensification of the
struggle by the Zimbabwean patriots, lan Smith released Joshua Nkomo
and the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole temporarily on the 8th November, 1974,
to enable them to attend a meeting in Lusaka, Zambia, with Presidents
Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, Sir Seretse Khama of Botswana, Kenneth
Kaunda of Zambia and Samora Machel of Mozambique. Bishop Abel
Muzorewa and Joshua Nkomo attended the first meeting. The Rev.
Ndabaningi Sithole could not attend because of new internal problems
which had beset ZANU. Unbeknown to the four Presidents and ZANU
External Wing in Lusaka, Rev. Sithole had been dismissed as President
of ZANU by the members of the Central Committee in prison and replaced
by Robert Mugabe, its Secretary-General. The internal problems of
ZANU relating to the Rev. Sithole were soon healed and on the 13th
November, 1974, he was reinstated as ZANU leader by the ZANU Ex-
ternal Wing in Lusaka.
64. Apart from the abortive dismissal of the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole
from ZANU leadership, another problem which beset ZANU at the time
of the Declaration of Unity in Lusaka was that of ZANU military cadres
at the Front. The cadres had mutinied against the Military High Com-
mand and were determined to replace it by a new High Command of
their own choice. While the Declaration of Unity was being signed, a
number of kidnappings and killings were taking place as a result of the
rebellion, until the Zambian and Mozambique authorities intervened.
65. The presence of the legitimate leaders of the people of Zimbabwe
ereated an atmosphere of hope that unity would at last be achieved. In
9

early December, arrangements were made to get the leaders together.
The meetings which started on the 3rd December, 1974, culminated in the
Declaration of Unity by Zimbabwe Nationalist Movements. The Unity
Accord was signed on the 7th December, 1974, at State House in Lusaka,
by four leaders, namely, Bishop Abel Muzorewa, President of ANC,
Joshua Nkomo, President of ZAPU, Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole, President
of ZANU, and James Chikerema, President of FROLIZI.
66. By the Declaration of Unity (copy of which is at Appendix ITT),
all nationalist movements were brought together under the umbrella of
the enlarged ANC led by Bishop Abel Muzorewa. Following this momen-
tous Declaration, Ian Smith also agreed to release the leaders of the
nationalist movements permanently. The ANC leaders made another
joint Declaration on arrival in Salisbury on December 11th (copy of
which is at Appendix IV). Consequently, the ANC was recognised by the
OAU Liberation Committee as the sole political party representing the
African people of Zimbabwe and the former parties ceased to be recognised.
CHAPTER 3
THE ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE AND OPERATION
OF ZANU
Dare-Re-Chimurenga
67. For closer proximity to the centre of the struggle and for better
co-ordination, ZANU moved its Headquarters to Lusaka, the capital of
Zambia, in 1966. The membership of the Revolutionary Council had grown
to 19 and proved ineffectual as a political organ. The name ‘Revolutionary
Council’ was subsequently dropped and replaced by DARE-RE-CHI-
MURENGA (War Council) or Supreme Council, after the War Council
of the Shona people of the late 19th Century. Above the DARE was the
Chimurenga General Council, which was answerable to the entire mem-
bership of the Party both inside and outside Zimbabwe and which was
composed of:
(i) members of the DARE;
(ii) members of the High Command;
(iii) full-time officials of the Party;
(iv) members of the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army
(ZANLA) General Staff.
CONFLICTS AND POWER STRUGGLE WITHIN ZANU
68. In 1969, membership of the Executive (now the DARE) was for
the first time determined by elections. This was a departure from the old
policy of appointments. But as subsequent events were to prove, this
was a regrettable step. It ultimately led to conflicts and serious division

in the DARE, and in ZANU itself. From this point in time, the history
of ZANU was characterised by the struggle for ascendancy between
rival groups which employed tribalism, thereby creating conflicts between
the Karangas and Manyikas. Chitepo himself was a Manyika, and this
fact eventually put him (as Chairman of the Party), in an awkward
position.
69. The DARE was limited in composition to a membership of
eight, and the elections of 1969 saw the Manyikas in the majority—five
Manyikas, three Karangas. Then began a dangerous struggle for power in
the DARE, a situation which imposed a severe test on the solidarity of the
Party as a whole in the course of the national liberation movement.
70. ZANU operated at two levels: political and military. These were
represented by particular officials in the DARE, and both important
and strategic posts, as it were, fell to the Manyikas. Noel Mukono, a
Manyika, was the Secretary for Defence in the DARE, and consequently,
operational matters came under his direct control. On the political
level, too, a Manyika, Simpson Mutambanengwe, occupied that office.
71. At the first Biennial Review Conference in April, 1969, those
elected to the DARE were:
(a) Herbert Chitepo .. xe .. Chairman
(b) Mukudzei Mudzi_ .. a .. Administrative Secretary
(c) Henry Hamadziripi ‘te .. Secretary for Finance
(d) Nathan Shamuyarira aa .. Secretary for External
Affairs
(e) Taziana Mutizwa .. - .. Publicity Secretary
(f) Stanley Parirewa .. He .. Secretary for Welfare
and Social Affairs
(g) Noel Mukono Se a .. Secretary for Defence
(hk) Simpson Mutambanengwe .. Secretary for Political
Affairs
72. On April 28th, 1966, ZANU started its armed struggle in
Zimbabwe. On that day, ZANLA engaged the enemy on the home ground,
in what has come to be known as the ‘ Battle of Sinoia’ in ZANU military
annals.
73. The years 1964 to 1971 saw the training and equipping of fighting
cadres for guerrilla and regular warfare. Military bases were established at
strategic points in Zimbabwe and Mozambique from which liberation
troops, called cadres, crossed over into Zimbabwe and opened campaign
centres.
74. The leaders of ZANU saw in this armed struggle the only way to
achieve the independence of Zimbabwe—especially after the victory of
the people of Mozambique over the Portuguese colonialists.
11

75. Evidence of power struggle within the rank and file of ZANU
based on tribalism started showing at the 1971 ZANU Conference held at
Kafue, Zambia, for the elections to the DARE (Supreme Council).
After the elections, the successful candidates were:
(a) Herbert Chitepo .. 24 .. Chairman—Manyika
(b) Mukudzei Mudzi .. +e .. Administrative Secretary—
Karanga
(c) Henry Hamadziripi ais .. Treasurer—Karanga
(d) Simpson Mutambanengwe .. Political Commissar—
Manyika
(e) Noel Mukono se “i .. Secretary for Defence—
Manyika
(f) Washington Malianga = .. Publicity Secretary—
Zezulu
(g) Richard Hove Se ar .. Foreign Affairs—
Karanga
(h) Stanley Parirewa .. 28 .. Secretary for Welfare
and Social Affairs—
Zezulu
76. Nathan Shamuyarira and Taziana Mutizwa, who were not re-
elected, resigned from the Party and later joined FROLIZI when it was
formed. Parirewa also resigned his post after two weeks and he, too,
joined FROLIZI. His vacant post in DARE was never filled.
77. The elections in 1971 again showed the Manyikas in greater
strength. The Karanga elements more than ever now intensified the
struggle to correct the imbalance in the DARE and to establish their
ascendancy.
78. They realised this objective in the DARE elections of 1973, and
at once proceeded to vigorously implement their policy of having Kara-
ngas in key posts and offices, both at the political and military levels
—and they succeeded.
79. At the Review Conference of September, 1973, the following
persons were elected to the DARE:
(a) Herbert Chitepo .. “9 .. Chairman—Manyika
(6) Mukudzei Mudzi_ .. i .. Administrative Secretary—
Karanga
(c) Noel Mukono “ Ss .. Secretary for External
Affairs—Manyika

Anonymous

So ZANU not really fought for this country but busy fighting each other for positions. They eliminated each other and pointed the finger to white settlers. This country was given back to black people not because they defeated the whites. The whites were never defeated. Very few casualties in the whites side. Black people were against themselves. 

(dz) Kumbirai Kangai .. a .. Secretary for Labour,
Social Services and
Welfare—Karanga
(e) Rugare Gumbo... Si .. Secretary for
Information and
Publicity—Karanga
(f) John Mataure Ss a .. Political Commissar—
Manyika
(7) Henry Hamadziripi - .. Secretary for Finance—
Karanga
(h) Josiah Tongogara .. ds .. Chief of Defence—
; Karanga
The Karangas won majority seats at this election—five Karangas and
three Manyikas.
80. Josiah Tongogara, a Karanga, took over from Noel Mukono,'‘a
Manyika, as ZANU Chief of Defence. As a member of the DARE and. also
leader of the ZANU Military High Command, he was in a position. to
effect major changes in the military sphere. The Karanga elements came
into effective control of ZANU in both its political and military aspects.
In the process, much ill-feeling was engendered in the Party and ZANU
lost the cohesive strength necessary for waging a national struggle of the
scale on which they had embarked. The petty wranglings and wrong
methods of dealing with real or imagined rivals for power plunged ZANU
into utter confusion.
ZANU and the UNITY Accord of December, 1974
81. To bring the Zimbabwe warring political factions to the sense of
responsibility they owed to their country, the OAU and the Presidents of
Zambia, Tanzania, Botswana and Mozambique attempted to unite them
and their efforts resulted in the Unity Accord of December, 1974.
82. The decision for all the Zimbabwe nationalist movements to
merge into the ANC was, however, strongly opposed within ZANU.
According to the evidence of the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole, President of
former ZANU, at the time they came to Lusaka for Unity talks, the
atmosphere was tense in his camp. There were two strong schools of
thought, he said. One school believed in Unity and the other believed
in the opposite. He stated further, that at the time the Zimbabwe Declara-
tion of Unity was signed, there was a strange feeling in the ZANU delega-
tion. Rev. Sithole in his own words said: ‘Some felt that we should not
have signed it, whereas others felt that we should sign the document.’
Joshua Nkomo said in evidence that ZANU was against unity and was
reluctant to subscribe
to the Unity Accord.

83. Members of the ZANU Executive (including Chitepo himself for
some time) put up a solid wall of opposition to the Unity Accord. They
saw in it the destruction of their ambitions. Convinced that the liberation
movement could only have meaning in the context of armed struggle, and
that ZANU’s Military Wing was in fact succeeding, they were not prepared
to sacrifice all this in a large entity where their identity would be lost;
their own ambitions would go over-board, and others would step in to
reap that for which they had not toiled. This was not to be, and so the
struggle continued even after the signing of the Unity Accord and waxed
strong.
CHAPTER 4
THE NHARI REBELLION
Causes of the Rebellion
84. The pent-up grievances of ZANU military cadres which came to a
head in late November and the early part of December, 1974, precipitated
a crisis of unparalleled proportions in the annals of ZANU External Wing.
Some cadres at the Front, led by their commanders, Thomas Nhari and
Dakarai Badza, had revolted against the Military High Command and
were irrevocably bent on ousting them from office and replacing them by
commanders of their own choice. Most of these cadres were of North-
Eastern origin.
85. As already stated, the 1973 Biennial Elections to the DARE saw
members of the Karanga group in the majority. The group had gone one
step in the overall plan to completely control ZANU both in its military
and. political aspects.
86. According to the evidence before the Commission, the Karanga
group began a process of removing commanders in the front line and
replacing them with Karangas, some of whom were inexperienced and
lacked the necessary qualifications. Rapid promotions of Karangas in the
military ranks followed, with a corresponding demotion of men of record
from other tribes—the Manyikas in particular.
87. The cadres said that the front line continued to be neglected
notwithstanding the fact that there was a new DARE and High Command
after the 1973 Biennial Elections and that there was no adequate super-
vision among the fighting forces because those charged with the responsi-
bility in the DARE were away from the zone of the campaigns. These
people did not visit the war zones to have first-hand knowledge of the
conditions prevailing there and to ascertain the need for essential military
equipment.
14

88, Conditions became insupportable. Some commanders in the
field felt that the only remedy for the deteriorating situation in which
they found themselves was to take matters into their own hands and
rectify the position by seizing and replacing the High Command and
taking them to the Front. This took the form of kidnappings by the
Nhari group when they got to Lusaka.
89. Listed below are the main grievances of the cadres:
(a) Short supplies of essential commodities and war materials at
the Front such as food, clothing, shoes and provisions for the
fighting forces. The troops had sometimes to obtain these from
FRELIMO in Mozambique. Even in the hazardous matter of
ferrying cadres across the Zambezi River to and from the
fighting zones, the commanders met with no consideration from
the High Command. Very often, FRELIMO had to assist with
crude native boats because no provision was made for the
supply of properly constructed boats for the operations.
(b) Those in charge of operations in the Military High Command
w)
were completely out of touch with what was going on at the
Front. They would not visit the areas where the fighting was
taking place even at the request of the field officers. The Military
High Command were not. therefore, in a position to appreciate
the difficulties the front line fighters were facing or to assess
what was involved.
Wholesale corruption riddled the Military High Command. This
manifested itself in the form of tribalism and preferential treat-
ment. It was alleged that funds intended for prosecution of the
war were mis-appropriated and misused by the leaders. These
leaders lived in luxury and affluence. Some engaged in business
while rumours were circulating to the effect that a member of
DARE was building a house in Lusaka for his wife. According to
the evidence, Chitepo himself had once expressed great surprise
at the ostentatious display of wealth by this person and had
complained to some members of ZANU. Since these people were
not gainfully employed, it was argued that such enterprises
could only have been possible through misappropriation of
monies donated by neighbouring African states, the OAU and
foreign organisations and intended for use by freedom fighters.
(d) There was also the case of whisky and cigarettes which Josiah
Tongogara, ZANU Chief of Defence, is said to have sent by the
Girl’s Platoon Leader for his relative, Josiah Tungamirai at the
Front. Drinking at the Front was forbidden. Here, the cadres
thought, was was a member of the High Command flagrantly
violating an important military code of discipline, only to favour
a relative.

(e) The irregular promotions by the Military High Command even in
cases of people newly arrived at the Front, like Josiah Tunga-
mirai, who was promoted to Provincial Political Commissar in
the MMZ Province in the first month of his arriving at the Front.
The post had been vacant for a long time, notwithstanding the
fact that there were capable officers who had been recommended
by their Provincial Commanders.
(f) Class distinction amongst the children of DARE and High
Command personnel. Some of these children, it was said, were
attending special schools in Lusaka. The issue of class distine-
tion was exacerbated by the fact that the wives of some DARE
and High Command members engaged in remunerative employ-
ment. The personal lives of some of the leaders in DARE and
High Command caused resentment among the rank and. file.
The way they lived fell far short of ZANU’s so****t principles,
they said. It was so****m for those who were down, the under-
dogs, they maintained.
(g) The policy of sending people to the Front as a form of punishment
was considered wrong and dangerous. A letter which had been
written by Molife and Badza to the Military High Command,
accusing them of corruption, resalted in Molife being sent to the
Front as punishment for his effrontery. Others too, suffered
similarly. The High Command, they felt, prostituted the noble
objectives of the war. Every soldier worth his salt should regard
going to the Front, not only as a national duty, but also as a
personal triumph. If soldiers were sent to the Front as punish-
ment every soldier committed to the fighting would regard orders
to go to the Front as a punishment and would tend to be inclined
to lose heart in the overall purpose of the fighting.
(h) The use of Freedom Fighter girls or cadres as house-maids and
concubines with whom to relax by the leaders of ZANU, was a
burning issue with cadres at the Front. Some of these girls had
relatives at the Front who kept track of their movements and
activities in Lusaka. These relatives used to come to Lusaka
from the Front for medical attention and saw things for them-
selves. Also, others who came to and from training camps saw
what was happening in Lusaka. It had been as a result of their
personal intervention and pleadings that their sisters had
registered for service in the Liberation Army. The girls were
trained to serve as nurses, soldiers, teachers etc. in the war zone
but the ZANU leaders in Lusaka, including members of the
DARE and High Command, deviated from this objective and used
them otherwise and even made some of them pregnant.
(i) The cadres from Operational Zones stated that they had come
across people they were convinced were agents. They gave

examples of this and alleged that despite their repeated re-
presentations to the High Command that these people were
enemy agents, no action was taken by the Military High Com-
mand.
90. However, according to the evidence obtained from the members
of DARE, the mutineers in the forefront were influenced by leaders in
Lusaka. The events of December, 1974, were master-minded by certain
members of DARE and other people living in Lusaka. Badza, Nhari and
Ceasar Molife had come to Lusaka sometime back saying that they were
sick and needed treatment. These people had several meetings with
Mukono, Santana and George Mpini, who advised them that the solution
to the problems they were facing in the forefront was for them to have a
new High Command. At one time Badza and Basil Chimbodza prepared a
document with the assistance of Malianga, Santana and George Mpini in
which they condemned DARE and High Command and praised the people
who had lost the elections in 1973.
91. After Badza had recovered in March, 1974, and was going back
to the forefront, he passed through Chifombo. There, he, Nhari and Molife
were involved in an incident in which Molife wanted to shoot Rex Nhongo,
but a member of the security arrested him. The blame was put on Badza,
who was senior. It was because of this that Badza was demoted and
replaced by Thomas Nhari as Provincial Operational Commander.
92. The belief that the NHARI rebellion was master-minded by the
rear leadership was also expressed by one of the militants who was in the
NHARI group. He was surprised about the meeting that Badza and other
escapees held with Mukono, Mutambanengwe, Malianga, Santana, Mpini
and others at Mautsa’s place on the 10th December, 1974. A member of
DARE should not have held meetings with people that had rebelled
against the High Command and DARE.
93. According to Tongogara, the rebellion was also instigated by the
propaganda of the rebel regime of Southern Rhodesia. The enemy used
psychological methods aimed at demoralising the ZANU armed forces at
the forefront. The propaganda concentrated on discrediting the work of
leading treedom fighters in ZANU and made reference to their luxurious
living in towns compared with the life of the young men in the forefront.
According to the propaganda, the young men were sent to die for those
who were living comfortable lives with their families in the city. Tongogara
said that according to his information, rebel soldiers led by a certain
Captain Soares met the ZANU militants led by Nhari. However, this story
of meeting rebel soldiers was completely rejected by the witnesses who
were in the NHARI group.
94. Tongogara admitted that some of the grievances of the militants
. in the forefront such as shortage of funds and war materials were genuine.
However, he added that they did not start in 1974. They had been with the
Party ever since the beginning of the struggle. He and his colleagues had
17

constantly explained these problems to the militants and all of them were
supposed to fully understand the problems. He admitted, however, that he,
as Chief of Defence had not been able to go inside Zimbabwe although
Kangai said that most members of the Military High Command had been
inside the country.
95. Tongogara said he was always at Chifombo and other bases in
Mozambique. There was always a member of the High Command stationed
at Chifombo who was in touch with the cadres at the forefront. If the
leaders lived well in Lusaka, it was because some were married to wives
with professional qualifications and who held responsible posts. The story
of the bottle of whisky, a carton of cigarettes and a pair of socks was
denied by Tongogara.
96. The High Command and DARE had not up to December, 1974,
appreciated the danger of punishing people by sending them to the fore-
front. The Party was prepared to review the policy. The story of immoral
conduct with the female cadres was denied, though not strongly. Tongo-
gara said that no leader was building a house in Lusaka. It was only a
wife or fiancé of one of the leaders who was building a house with a loan
from the Zambia National Building Society.
NHARI GROUP ON THE MARCH TO LUSAKA
97. In pursuance of their resolve to change the ZANU Military High
Command in Lusaka, the dissatisfied cadres at the Front (mostly North-
Easterners) organised a meeting about the middle of November, 1974, at
which the High Command headed by Josiah Tongogara was purportedly
deposed and replaced by the following new High Command:
(a) Thomas Nhari, Chief of Defence—Zezulu (NE)
(6) Dakarai Badza, Chief of Operations—Manyika (NE)
(c) Patrick Tabenga, Chief Political Commissar—Zezulu (NE)
(d) Ceasar Molife, Chief of Security and Intelligence—Manyika (NE)
(e) Hebert Mutise, Chief of Personnel—Korekore (NE)
(f) Peter Sheba, Chief Representative (East Africa) Zezulu (NE)
(g) Cephas Tichatonga, Chief of Logistics—Manyika (NE)
(hk) Chemist N’cube, Chief Instructor—Zezulu (NE)
(1) Cuthbert Chimedza, Military Attaché (East Africa)—Karanga
(SE)
(j) Timothy Chiredza, Chief of Transport—Korekore (NE)
(k) Sam Chandawa, Provincial Chief of Defence—Karanga (SE)
98. This new High Cominand was also organised on regional lines, as
all but two of its members came from the North-East, in contrast to the
deposed Military High Command whose membership was predominantly
composed of South-Easterners.

99. At this meeting, it was resolved that all the members of the
deposed High Command were to be brought to the Front as ordinary
cadres.
106. Consequently, a group of thirty cadres led by Thomas Nhari
marched from the Front towards Chifombo. On their way, they found that
new recruits had been organised by a self-confessed enemy agent, who
rofessed to be a relation of a member of the High Command. Under the
orders of this agent, the recruits had destroyed the boats used for ferrying
cadres to and from the war zones and had also planned to run away. After his
open confession to the Nhari group, the enemy agent was physically
eliminated by that group.
101. As they continued their journey, they met a group of cadres
carrying war materials and found among them another well-known,
self-confessed enemy agent. It was revealed in evidence that he had
caused several deaths in Zimbabwe as a result of the information he gave
to Ian Smith’s forces. He had been discovered by the militants and warned,
but to no avail. He too was executed by the Nhari group.
102. According to the evidence before the Commission, the Nhari
Group took over Chifombo peacefully, although other accounts point to
the contrary. It is reported that the Camp Commandant, Sheba Gava,
was found drunk. He was arrested and taken to the Front together with
his comrades Silas Shamiso, Timothy Gudura, and Madib Muchasvipedza.
Gava had been forced by the group to give them K400 (four hundred
kwacha—Zambian currency) and to sign all necessary passes to enable
them to cross the Luangwa river to Lusaka.
103. The following cadres were among the rebel group that took
over Chifombo:
(a) Thomas Nhari (leader) (NE)
(b) Cephas Tichatonga (NE)
c) Sam Chandawa (SE)
d) Ceasar Molife (NE)
e) Peter Sheba (NE)
) Rameck Gatawa (NE)
) Seisa Malisha (SH)
) Elias Mhanda (NE)
) Loveness Chitankwa (NE)
4) Revayi Mabunu (NE)
k) Loice Moyo (NE)
19

109. After this, Nhari and his colleagues came to Lusaka on the 6th
December, 1974, in order to discuss the position with DARE and try to
establish a new system of working. The list of the members of the new
High Command was subject to the approval of DARE.
110. By this time, the news of the kidnapping and the shooting
incident at Chigowe’s house had spread throughout the ZANU circles.
There appeared to have been a division of opinion among ZANU leaders
on what appropriate steps to take against the Nhari group. Some called
for tough action while others advocated negotations with the rebels.
111. Both the DARE and the High Command finally opted for
mediation. As unity talks were taking place in Lusaka at this time,
members of the DARE were fully occupied. However, they mandated
Josiah Tongogara (Chief of Defence) and John Mataure (Political Com-
missar) to hold discussions with the Nhari group. Tongogara and Mataure
met the Nhari group at No. 93 Mpelembe Street, New Kabwata.
112. At that meeting, Nham, as spokesman for his group, outlined
all their grievances to Tongogara and Mataure. The Nhari group speci-
fically requested to meet the DARE and discuss matters with them.
113. Tongogara and Mataure met the other members of DARE the
following morning at Mulungushi Village and reported what transpired
between them and the Nhari group. The DARE took a decision that they
were not going to listen to these grievances until the rebels surrendered
back those comrades they had kidnapped. This decision was conveyed.
to the Nhari group accordingly by both Mataure and Tongogara.
114, The Nhari group had collected information during their second
visit to Lusaka that Chigowe was organising an army from ZANU camps
and that all soldiers at the ZANU farm were well armed in readiness
for the group. The prospects of reconciliation having failed to bear fruit,
Nhari and his group returned to Chifombo and prepared for their last and
final onslaught on the Military High Command in Lusaka.
115. On the 9th December, 1974, a group of armed cadres led by
Nhari came to Lusaka and kidnapped 19 persons most of whom were
Karangas. Amongst them were the followings
(a) Mrs Angelina Tongogara and her three children—Karanga (SE)
(b) Kumbirai Kangai—Karanga (E)
(c) Peter Chiwota—Karanga (SE)
(d) Timothy Chimbodza—Karanga (SE)
(e) Mukudzei Mudzi—Karanga (SE)
(f) Peter Shoniwa—Karanga (SE)
The Arrest of the Nhari Group
116. Before Nhari and his group could lay their hands on all the
members of the High Command, they were intercepted by the Police. Of
21

the Nhari group that came to Lusaka, 16 were apprehended by the
Police while six escaped arrest. Those who escaped back to Chifombo were:
(a) Dakarai Badza
(6) Chemist N’cube
(c) Seisa Malisha
(d) Nephew Ndanga
(e) Timothy Chiredza
(f) Mativonesa Kupfuwahandu
Badza and other members of the Nhari group left two machine guns at the
house of Edgar Madekurozwa when they escaped to Chifombo after the
arrest of Nhari and others.
117. Those arrested were briefly detained by the Zambian Government
pending Government decision. It was during this period that 10 of the 16
abductors escaped from custody on{the 31st December, 1974. These were:
(a) Thomas Nhari
(6) Cephas Tichatonga
(c) Peter Sheba
(d) Sam Chandawa
(e) Elias Mhanda
(f) Madiba Gatawa
(9) Catherine Garanewako
(h) Farayi Kufakunesu
(2) Elizabeth Mudyanevana
(j) Ceasar Molife
118. The following did not escape:
(a) Hewitti Mangena
(0) Fungayi Musha
(c) Loveness Chitankwa
(4) Muchaneta Mabunu
(e) Revai Mabunu
(f) Loice Moyo
119. Among those who escaped, the following were recaptured by the
Police at Rufunsa:
(a) Thomas Nhari
(b) Peter Sheba
(c) Sam Chandawa
(d) Elizabeth Mudyanevana
(e) Farayi Kufakunesu

120. In an effort to find a solution to the problems of these abductions
a meeting was convened on the 28rd January, 1975, with Zambian Senior
Government Officials at which Chitepo, Mukudzei Mudzi, Kumbirai
Kangai and Rugare Gumbo, were present. The purpose of this meeting
was to get first-hand information from the rebel group as to why they
wanted to overthrow the High Command.
121. Thomas Nhari, the leader of the rebel group outlined the reasons
and produced a document containing grounds for their rebellion against
the High Command. It was discovered that the proper channel and
procedure for expressing grievances had not been followed. A decision was
then taken that the Nhari group were to remain under detention until the
next meeting that day.
122. At the meeting which followed, Zambian Government Officials
asked Chitepo what action he mtended to take against the mutineers if
they were handed over to ZANU. Chitepo explained that past experience
had shown, that given a chance, wrong-doers can always reform through
reorientation. He went on to say that the Party would like to have the men
back. On being asked whether the men would not be executed if handed
over, Chitepo replied that in ZANU’s code of discipline, execution was not
one of the punishments prescribed.
123. Asa result of Chitepo’s firm assurances, the Zambian Authorities
agreed to hand over the detained cadres to the Party. However, before the
actual handing over on the 27th January, 1975, three of the recaptured
ex-ZANU cadres had again escaped on the 26th January, 1975. These were:
(a) Thomas Nhari
(6) Sam Chandawa
(c) Peter Sheba
CHAPTER 5
THE AFTERMATH OF NHARI REBELLION
Recapture of Chifombo by High Command
124. According to Tongogara’s evidence, after the incidents of the 9th
to the 10th December, 1975, the DARE decided that the situation should
be normalised. A meeting was held at which all the eight members were
present. It examined the situation and found that John Mataure was
guilty of ‘conniving at the actions of the rebels’. According to Tongogara,
some of the charges made against Mataure were—
(a) that the rebels got the Land-Rover from Mataure which they
used to convey Ndangana and others to Chifombo;
23

I will continue with the Report on Assassination of Chitepo. 

so this is it, Zanu is a product of other pple's struggle that's why my father always said real heroes died in the front and these that claim to be heroes were busy enjoying them selves at camps or others were even spying and selling out our fellow comrades. now l have come to understand wht my father was saying

🌶 

kkk vana mnangagwa vaoneswa moto muhtown umo

😂

So just cause of surname you saw an opportunity to make it news worth.

Slick iPhones. 
Harare is full of all kinds of thieves 

Thief

please don't tempt us we will steal and hit even you are related to the president  secondly don't come kaAvenues it's for us thieves and drug dealer 

Vinshie

The sequence of events in the story is not making sense. 

Ita mushe iwe! Zvonzi munhu akabirwa fone, kwava kufonera hanzvadzi yake, hanzvadzi yake ndokuuya ikasvikodzingirira mbavha kwava kuibata! kuipa 30 seconds chaidzo mbavha hauione kuti yaindepi

where?

where did brother materialise from to give chase?

@Vhedza 

Yaa not making sense to ama2000 because they hate history for it reveals the dirty politics of today. 

doug

The Harare Avenues is truly a busy area! As the reporter says, phones are snatched daily from different people and different types of cars. This would have been news if the thief knew who he was stealing from and had carefully or carelessly planned the act. 

BIG T 

Zvongoda isu nezvimbudzi zvedu ukangoba ndototenga chimwe ndakanyarara Apana anoziva kt ndabirwa 4ni

kkkk

coni

tafman

@where...it is stated that the brother was following behind. read to understand

buditsai mukomana haana mhosva ari pakutsvaga

ngaaaaa

A 43-year-old suspected thief was arraigned before a magistrate on Tuesday for allegedly snatching an iPhone from a woman while she was driving in Harare’s avenues area, reported <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/local-news/article/200022794/thief-snatches-mnangagwas-phone">NewsDay</a>.
Oliver Rimai appeared before Harare magistrate Sharon Rakafa who remanded him in custody to 26 February.
The court heard that Rimai usually targets motorists whom he steals from as they stop at the traffic lights.
Allegations are that on 01 February at around 7:45 PM, the victim, Chido Mnangagwa was driving her Mercedes-Benz along 7th Street.
Mnangagwa stopped at the traffic lights intending to turn left into Hebert Chitepo Avenue.
Rimai allegedly snatched Mnangagwa’s iPhone 15 Pro Max through an open passenger’s side window and ran away.
Chido immediately advised her brother Tichaona Viano about the incident who pursued and apprehended Rimai.
The phone, valued at US$1 900, was recovered before he was taken to the police.
More: <a href="https://www.pindula.co.zw/">Pindula News</a>

Thief Snatches Chido Mnangagwa's iPhone

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